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SWIMMING AGAINST A LEGAL CURRENT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
BRENT R.H. JOHNSTONt

The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada
was intended to establish ongoing cooperative management of the west coast
salmon stocks. In recent years, however, disputes over Pacific salmon have
recurred, and relations between the parties have become increasingly
acrimonious. This paper critically reviews the Pacific Salmon Treaty and
identifies aspects of the Treaty which tend to frustrate cooperative relations.
From this analysis, it is concluded that concerns over long-term resource
conservation and short-term resource allocation are poorly reconciled under
the Treaty. Finally recommendations far improving the bilateral salmon
management effort are outlined.
Le Traite sur le saumon du Pacifique mis sur pied entre !es Etats-Unis et le
Canada en 1985 avait pour mission d'etablir une cooperation permanente
dans !'administration des reserves de saumon de la cote ouest. Tout
recemment, !es conjlits al 'egard du saumon du Pacifique ont cependant refait
surface et !es relations entre !es deux pays se sont envenim ees. Cet ouvrage
propose une revue critique du Traite sur le saumon du Pacifique et une
identification des aspects annihilant !es efforts de cooperation. A la suite de
cette analyse, !'auteur conclut que !es interets relatifi a la conservation des
ressources a long terme et la distribution des ressources immediates s 'averent
improprement reconcilies par l'entremise de ce Traite. L 'auteur termine en
soumettant certaines recommandations dans le but d 'ameliorer !'effort
d'administration bilaterale des reserves de saumon.

Modern management of living marine resources must balance
significant economic, cultural, and political factors while at the
same time ensuring against resource depletion. Although
challenging in themselves, these factors assume a greater complexity
in relation to anadromous species management which must contend
with legitimate but competing claims of national jurisdiction. This
scenario is perhaps best exemplified by the case of Canadian and
t B.A. (Victoria), LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
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American salmon management on the west coast of North
America.
In 1985, after more than a decade of negotiations, the United
States and Canada signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty1 in an effort to
provide for the joint management of west coast salmon. The
fundamental objective of the Treaty is to provide fishery
management regimes which are based on fair allocation and
conservation of the resource and which are capable of responding to
changes in Pacific salmon stocks. As such, the agreement represents
a legal response to an international marine resource management
issue and endeavors to foster an unprecedented measure of
cooperation and coordination between the signatories. The Pacific
Salmon Treaty has been the primary regulatory apparatus governing
the two countries' use of salmon on the west coast since 1985.
For the past four consecutive years, however, the two countries
have been unable to arrive at mutually agreeable salmon
management regimes under the Treaty. 2 This has led to political
action which has been perceived as indicating the general collapse of
the agreement. In June 1994, Canada imposed a license
requirement aimed at u.s. salmon fishers for vessels crossing
selected west coast waters.3 One year later salmon fishers from
British Columbia obstructed the route of an Alaskan state ferry
and, more recently, the United States government unilaterally
declared a right of u.s. passage through the waters between
Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland. 4 For the
most part, these events transpired amidst allegations of overfishing,
disregard for international law, and negotiating in bad faith.5
Despite intervention by high ranking political officials, the
appointment of Yves Fortier as Canada's lead negotiator, and an
1 Fisheries Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America (18 March
1985), Canada Treaty Series 1985 No.7 [hereinafter cited as Pacific Salmon Treaty
or Treary](in force 18 March 1985).
2 See T. McDorman, "The West Coast Salmon Dispute: A Canadian View of the
Breakdown of the 1985 Treaty and the Transit License Measure" (1995) 17:3 Loy.
L.A. Int'! & Comp.L.J. 477.
3 Jbid.
4 "u.s. Challenges Canadian Boat Fee" The [Toronto} Globe and Mail (6 March
1996) A-1.
5 See McDorman, supra note 2 and Alison Arnot "Stalemate in the Pacific
Salmon Treaty Negotiations" Internet address: www.westcoast.com/augfish.html
(visited October, 1996).
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effort at formal mediation between the parties, progress on salmon
management agreements under the Pacific Salmon Treaty has
remained extremely difficult, if not impossible. 6 A sense of the
frustration generated by the constant struggle between the parties is
effectively conveyed in the introduction to the Pacific Salmon
Commission's 1995/96 Annual Report. The Commission writes:
The challenges facing the Commission in 1996 and
beyond remain difficult. Prodigious efforts will have to
be advanced by all concerned to ensure that the
cornerstone principles of the Treaty are developed and
implemented to their full potential to provide security
for the future of the combined fisheries resources of the
two countries as well as improved opportunities for the
many diverse groups who rely on Pacific salmon for
sustenance, pleasure, and profit. 7
This paper attempts to contribute to the relatively sparse
literature on the Pacific Salmon Treaty by providing a critical
analysis of the Treaty in light of particular issues surrounding recent
breakdowns in bilateral salmon management on the west coast. To
what extent can failed efforts at agreeing on salmon management
be traced to the scheme of the Pacific Salmon Treaty? Has the Pacific
Salmon Treaty fallen short of effectively ensuring ongoing
cooperative management?
The examination is in four parts. The first part briefly surveys
the background to the Pacific Salmon Treaty and identifies the
factors which motivated its formation. This includes a cursory
review of the first effective bilateral agreement between the parties.
The second part provides a thorough overview of the terms and
structure of the Treaty, the applicable provisions of the Law of the
Sea Convention, 8 and, to a limited degree, United States
implementing legislation. Attention is given to the LOS Convention
as the general international legal frame of reference for the Pacific
Salmon Treaty. The third part critically analyses the scheme of the
6 See

Ted McDorman, supra note 2 and John Crosbie, Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans, Remarks (Media Conference on the Pacific Salmon Treaty 17 June 1993)
[unpublished].
7 Pacific Salmon Commission, 1995196 Eleventh Annual Report at xii.
8 Law of the Sea Convention, UN Doc. NCon£ 62/122 (7 October 1982), 21
I.L.M. 161 [hereinafer Law ofthe Sea Convention or LOS Convention].
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Treaty with reference to particular difficulties experienced by
Canada and the United State in Treaty negotiations. Finally, the
fourth part concludes the analysis by outlining recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of bilateral salmon species
management between the two countries.
It is ultimately argued that although the Treaty is concerned in
principle to ensure long-term, balanced salmon management, the
Treaty's form and structure demonstrate a general reluctance on the
part of the signatories to "jeopardize" short-term interests.
Essentially, this amounts to a tension within the Treaty between
long-term resource conservation and short-term resource allocation.
Until this tension is more effectively reconciled, CanadianAmerican relations over west coast salmon management are likely
to remain discordant.
I. THE NEED FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION ON
THE WEST COAST

International legal regimes such as the Pacific Salmon Treaty are
products of particular international circumstances and, by their very
existence, they reflect a desire for inter-state cooperation. As such, a
critical analysis of the scheme of the Treaty in light of the
breakdown in cooperative management would be incomplete
without at least a cursory overview of the circumstances which led
to its formation.
1. The Nature of Anadromous Species
The basis for Canadian-American efforts to coordinate the
management of Pacific salmon lies first with the nature of the
resource. Salmon, being anadromous, begin their existence in freshwater rivers, spend most of their lives in the ocean, and return after
one to seven years to spawn in their fresh-water habitats. 9 Each of
the five species of Pacific salmon (chinook, chum, coho, sockeye,
and pink) is genetically adapted to the environment in which it
resides and exhibits unique characteristics such as migration route,

9 See D. McRae & G. Munro, eds., Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies
and the New Law of the Sea (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1989) 19; T. Jensen, "The United-States Canada Pacific Interception Treaty: An
Historical and Legal Overview" (1986) 16 Envd. L. 363 at 369.
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migration timing, and productivity. 10 Often, the migration routes
can take salmon thousands of miles from their rivers of origin. 11
The dependence of salmon on fresh water, however, requires
protected inland habitats and unobstructed water routes from the
ocean to inland spawning grounds. Clearly, this can only effectively
be provided for by the state in which the habitats and water routes
are located.
2. The Importance of the Salmon Resource

The harvesting of salmon has always been a significant component
of Pacific coast economies and cultures. During 1990-1994, the
total landed value of the five major salmon species harvested
commercially in British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and
Southeast Alaska was approximately u.s.$300 million. 12 In British
Columbia, the commercial fishery provides over 15,000 jobs and
the 1989 recreational fishery, of which salmon fishing was a major
component, generated $1.3 billion. 13 In both the u.s. and Canada,
many small communities are almost wholly reliant on the salmon
fishery.
Additionally, salmon have an immense cultural importance to
the First Nations peoples of the west coast. 14 The relationship
between the First Nations people and the salmon resource is legally
protected in both the United States and Canada resulting in both
countries having a designated Aboriginal or tribal fishery. 15 The
economic, cultural, and social importance of the salmon along the

lO Pacific Salmon Commission, The Pacific Salmon Treaty (Vancouver: Pacific
Salmon Publication, 1988).
11 See]. Yanagida, "The Pacific Salmon Treaty" (1987) 81 Am. J. Int'! L. 577 at

577.
12

See D. Huppert, "u.s./Canada Salmon Wars: Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Has Not Brought Peace" (1996) 1 New Directions in Marine Affairs (report series
of the University of Washington) 1.
13 See Crosbie, supra note 6.
14 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 368.
l5 C. Wilkinson & D. Connor, 'The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery:
Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource"
(1983) 32 U. Kan. L. Rev. 17 at 26-30.
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west coast has, as a result, made salmon management a high
political priority for both countries.I 6

3. The Interception Problem
Given the anadromous nature and lengthy migration patterns of
salmon, west coast salmon management is complicated by the
implications of the region's geo-political divisions for the salmon
fisheries. Dozens of rivers and streams along the west coast of
North America between Alaska and Northern California produce
salmon and serve as salmon habitats. I? As salmon migrate, they
depart the rivers of one country and pass through the ocean waters
of the other country. Thus, salmon which originate in Canadian
rivers migrate into American waters and vice versa. Interception
occurs when salmon originating in one country are harvested by
fishers of the other country. Is
For west coast salmon management, interception presents a
substantial complication and examples of "the perplexing result
when human-drawn jurisdictions are superimposed upon the
salmon's migratory instinct" are numerous.I9 Various stocks which
spawn in Canadian stretches of rivers that rise in British Columbia
but enter the sea through the Alaskan panhandle are intercepted by
Alaskan fishers. 2° Chinook stocks spawned on the northern coast of
Oregon and the upper Columbia river are harvested by Canadian
and Alaskan fishers off northern B.C. and southeastern Alaska. 2 I
Canadian fishers harvest chinook, coho, and chum stocks of
Washington state origin in the waters between Vancouver Island
and the B.C. mainland. 22 While these examples are by no means
exhaustive, they illustrate the extent to which the United States and
Canada have overlapping and interdependent interests in Pacific
salmon.

l6

For a thorough survey of the political import of salmon, see Jensen, supra note

17

Ibid 370.

9.
"Interception" is defined in art. I, para. 4 of the Pacific Salmon Treaty as "the
harvesting of salmon originating in the waters of one Party by a fishery of the other
Party."
l9 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 371.
20 Ibid. see also Pacific Salmon Commission, supra note 10.
21 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 371.
22 Ibid at 370
IS
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4. Early Cooperation: The Fraser River Convention
Historically, as long as the salmon resource continued to satisfy
each country's demands, interception was not an issue for fisheries
management.23 Neither country was concerned where salmon
originated as long as each country was able to secure as much of the
resource as it required. However, once habitat destruction and new
fishing technologies began to depress the supply of salmon, the
delicate and trans-boundary nature of the resource was firmly
underscored. 24 In 1913, a disaster at Hells Gate Canyon 2s resulted
in the destruction of tens of thousands of Fraser River salmon and,
as a consequence, provided the impetus for the first effective effort
at bilateral salmon management. 26
In May 1930, Canada and the United States signed a
convention aimed at the restoration and equal harvest sharing of
Fraser River salmon.27 This convention established the International
Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (IPSFC) 28 which was
composed of three members from each country and was charged
with the task of regulating the sockeye and pink salmon 29 fisheries
23 Ibid.
24

In 1908, the countries made an effort at joint management through the BryceRoot Treaty, although the Treaty was, as one commentator has written, "stillborn":
D. McRae & G.Munro, supra note 9, see also Marilyn Twitchell, "Implementing
the u.s.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty: The Struggle to Move from 'Fish Wars' to
Cooperative Fishery Management" (1989), 20 Ocean Dev. & Int'! L. 409 at 410.
25 On the Hells Gate Canyon disaster, see Jensen, supra note 9 at 373.
26 The Fraser River, which is entirely within British Columbia, drains much of
southern and central British Columbia and enters northern Puget Sound at
Vancouver. The river has been described as "the western hemisphere's most
important salmon river": D. McRae & G. Munro, supra note 9 at 21.
27 United States-Canada Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and
Expansion of the Socleeye Salmon Fishery in the Fraser River System, 26 May 1930,
50 Stat. 1355 (1930), 8 U.S.T. 1058, T.I.A.S. No. 3867 [hereinafter Fraser River
Convention]. The agreement did not enter into force, however, until 28 July 1937,
due to a supplementary agreement being required in order to secure u.s. Senate
approval: see A Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of
Regional Fisheries Organizations (London: Fishing News Books Ltd., 1973) at 84.
28 Art. II, Fraser River Convention, supra note 27.
29 While the Convention was originally limited to sockeye salmon, it was
amended in 1956 to include pink salmon as a result of mutual overfishing: art. I of
the Protocol between the Government of the United States and the Government of
Canada to the Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the
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within a defined marine area. 30 Approval of at least two of each
country's appointees was required in order for the IPSFC to act.31
Essentially, the "compromise" at the heart of the Convention
involved providing the United States with fifty percent of the
Fraser River sockeye harvest in exchange for American financial and
technical contributions.32
The strength of the Fraser River Convention was its provision for
direct and effective regulation of the salmon resource. The IPSFC
was assigned the power to prescribe fishing gear33 and to apply
measures to limit or prohibit the sockeye (and, later, pink) salmon
fishery.34 Moreover, the signatories agreed to assume responsibility
for the enforcement of orders and regulations passed by the IPSFc35
and to provide penalties for violations.36 The fact that the IPSFC did
not operate by consensus reduced the likelihood of both deadlock
and diluted action. These characteristics appear to have given the
IPSFC greater clout than would accompany a strictly advisory
mandate; rather than simply making recommendations, the IPSFC
determined measures which bound fishers immediately and which
were, by agreement, to be upheld and enforced by the signatories
to the Convention. 37
The IPSFC proved effective. It rebuilt stocks of Fraser River
salmon38 while earning and maintaining the support of the fishing

Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, 28 December 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1057, T.I.A.S. No. 3867 and see also Jensen, supra note 9 at 375.
30 This area not only included the Fraser River and its tributary streams and
lakes, but also certain territorial waters and high seas: Fraser River Convention, art.
I, paras. 1-3).
3l Fraser River Convention, art. VI.
32 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 374.
33 Art. V of the Fraser River Convention provides that "the Commission may
prescribe the size of the meshes in all fishing gear."
34 Art. IV provided that the IPSFC was "empowered to limit or prohibit taking
sockeye salmon."
35 Art. VIII provides: "Each Contracting Party shall be responsible for the
enforcement of the orders and regulations adopted by the [rPSFC] under the
authority of this Convention .... ".

36 Art.X
37

See Koers, supra note 27 at 84: "The [IPSFC] is one of the few organizations
with the explicit responsibility of allocating the catch between the fishermen [sic] of
the two member states ... [and] it has the unique power to make certain decisions
that are directly binding on the fishermen [sic]."
38

Ibid.
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industry dependent on the Fraser runs.39 Importantly, much of its
success has been attributed to it being "a fisheries commission with
a comprehensive delegation of authority to manage a resource."40
5. Lead up to the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Despite the achievements of the IPSFC, its narrow scope41 meant
that a large number of salmon interceptions escaped its reach. In
addition, Canada was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
uneven distribution of indirect costs arising from the Treaty such as
foregone Fraser River hydroelectric projects. 42 This led to Canada's
perception that the equal division of Fraser River stocks was
burdensome and unfair. 43 Finally, in the 1960s, an increase in
Canadian harvests of American-produced Chinook and Coho
stocks and the extension by both countries of their fishing zones
from three to twelve miles underscored the already existing need
for renewed discussions over transboundary salmon management.44
In 1970, Canada and the United States entered into a bilateral
reciprocal fishing accord primarily as a consequence of the
countries' extended fisheries jurisdictions. 45 The agreement
included the Pacific salmon species; specifically, it permitted
United States fishers to continue to troll for salmon within the
Canadian three-to-twelve mile zone off the west coast of Vancouver
Island and allowed Canadian fishers to troll for salmon within the
same jurisdictional zone off of Washington state. 46 In addition, the
accord required consultation within one year on the Pacific salmon
fisheries.47 Under this requirement, negotiations commenced in
1971 which led ultimately to the Pacific Salmon Treaty of 1985. 48
39 See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 15 at 58.
40 See E. Miles et al., The Management of Marine Regions: The North Pacific
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1982) at 74.
41 As noted above, the IPSFC applied to a limited marine area and to only two of
five species of salmon.
42 See McRae & Munro, supra note 9 at 21.
43 Ibid.
44 See Twitchell, supra note 24 at 411.
45 Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges in Certain Areas off Their Coasts,
24 April 1970, United States-Canada, 21 U.S.T. 1283.
46 Ibid. at 1284. See also Jensen, supra note 9 at 379-81.
47 Ibid. at 1285.
48 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 380.
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The IPSFC was finally eliminated one year after the Padfic Salmon
Treaty entered into force. 49
6. Issues in Pacific Salmon Treaty Negotiations
Although the impetus for the Pacific Salmon Treaty stemmed from
the factors identified above, other factors also played an influential
role in the consultations leading to the agreement. Two
circumstances are of particular significance since, as will be seen,
they remain points of contention between the parties.
First, although the parties were initially satisfied with sustaining
the then-prevailing levels of interceptions,5° regard
for
environmental degradation5 1 and salmon enhancement initiatives52
led to a change in strategy during the mid 1970s.53 The parties
became increasingly occupied with ensuring that the benefits of
their efforts in respect of environmental management and fisheries
enhancement accrued to their fishers and not to the fishers of the
other country.54 As a consequence, negot1at10ns focused on
developing a formula by which the parties could account for the
quantity of salmon produced in their waters and the quantity
harvested by their fishers.5 5 A lack of mutually acceptable progress
on this issue plagued the parties throughout the negotiations.56
Second, in the early 1980s, scientists in both countries noted a
dramatic decline in United States and Canadian chinook and coho
stocks. For instance, chinook stocks from the upper Columbia River
declined from 72, 100 fish in 1971 to 34,200 fish in 1979 .57 In
1982, Canada reported that ocean escapements58 of chinook to B.C.
rivers and streams were less than 50 percent of that required for
49

Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra art. )0/, para. 3.
50 See Twitchell, supra note 24 at 112.
5! For an extensive discussion of the effect of dams

on salmon habitat up to and
during the early 1970s, see Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 15 at 35-43.
52 New hatcheries were being proposed on the Fraser River, in Washington
State, and on the Columbia River in Oregon. See E. Miles, supra note 39 at 70-71.
53 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 382. See also Twitchell, supra note 24 at 112.
54 See Twitch ell, ibid. at 111.
55 This ultimately led to the parties seeking a mathematical model which proved
to be impossible at the time due to the complexity and range of variables and the
competing interpretations placed on available data: Jensen, supra note 9 at 384.
56 Jbid.
57 Ibid. at 387-8.
58 "Escapement"

is when the fish pass through (escape) the ocean fisheries and
return to coastal streams and rivers to spawn.

SWIMMING AGAINST A LEGAL CURRENT

135

optimal production. 59 Research revealed that the depressed chinook
stocks were attributable to the combined effects of environmental
degradation and over-harvesting. This introduced a sense of
urgency into the negotiations. 60
In summary, bilateral cooperation in west coast salmon
management stems from the anadromous nature of salmon, the
economic and historical importance of salmon stocks, the
interception phenomenon and a recognition of the transnational
impact of local and national environmental and fisheries issues. The
initial desire for cooperation led to the Fraser River Convention
which appears to have provided for effective but limited
management. Moreover, as will be seen, the issues of chinook
management and harvest allowances which plagued the negotiations
leading to the Treaty persist as current difficulties. It is perhaps
somewhat ironic that while the shortcomings of the Fraser River
Convention contributed to the Pacific Salmon Treaty negotiations,
the notable success of the Convention may well have reinforced for
the parties the potential for effective salmon management through
bilateral legal accord.

II. THE LOS CONVENTION AND THE PACIFIC
SALMON TREATY: A PORTRAIT OF THE
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WEST
COAST SALMON MANAGEMENT

A critical assessment of the Pacific Salmon Treaty in light of failed
bilateral management efforts first requires an overview of the
agreement's principles, provisions and structure. Before undertaking
this discussion, however, it is to be noted that the Pacific Salmon
Treaty did not emerge into a legal vacuum. Although the accord is
very much a product of particular circumstances shared historically
by the United States and Canada, the Law of the Sea Convention
provides an international legal backdrop for bilateral fisheries
management and, as a result, delimits the basic parameters of the

59 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release/Communique
NR-PR-95-29E "Department of Fisheries and Oceans Announces New Measures
to Save Chinook Salmon Stocks in B.C." (23 April 1992).
60 Ibid.
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Pacific Salmon Treaty. 61 It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the
LOS Convention in order to assess whether the Pacific Salmon Treaty
is congruous with general international law on anadromous species
management.
1. The Law of the Sea Convention
As a result of the economic, cultural, and historical interests of
states where anadromous species originate, anadromous species
occupied a prominent position in fisheries negotiations from the
outset of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (uNCLOS m) .62 In fact, both Canada and the United States
emerged as leaders at UNCLOS III in the push for special recognition
for anadromous species within the LOS Convention. 63
Although neither the United States nor Canada has ratified the
LOS Convention and, of the two, only Canada is a signatory, the LOS
provisions on anadromous species nonetheless warrant discussion. It
is observed that state practice in relation to anadromous species
appears to closely follow the LOS Convention and, as William Burke
argues, this supports the view that the Convention's anadromous
species provisions reflect customary international law principles. 64
Moreover, the fact that there was a high level of consensus and
careful negotiation over the issue of anadromous species contributes
to this conclusion. 65 Hence, while the general legality of the LOS
Convention in relation to the United States and Canada is beyond
the scope of this paper, there are strong arguments that the
anadromous species provision represents customary international
law principles by which both countries are obligated to abide.
2. Article 66: The Anadromous Species Regime
The Convention recognizes that different species of living resources
feature unique natural characteristics and thereby require different
legal classifications for effective regulation. 66 In particular, there was
consensus among the parties to UNCLOS III on the special interest of
61

See McDorman, supra note 2.

62 See W. Burke, "Anadromous Species and the New International Law of the

Sea" (1991) 22 Ocean Dev. & Int'! L. 95 at 100.
63 Ibid. at 100.
61; Ibid. at 118.
65 See McDorman, supra note 2 at 485.
66 Ibid.
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the state of origin and its role throughout the migratory range of
anadomous species. 67 This consensus led to article 66(1) which
acknowledges that the state of origin "shall have the primary
interest in and responsibility for [anadromous] stocks." 68
Article 66(2) imposes on the state of origin the responsibility to
take appropriate measures for conservation of anadromous stocks
"through regulatory measures for fishing" within the 200 nautical
mile zone69 and on the high seas.7° It is further provided under
paragraph 2 that "[t]he state of origin may, after consultations with
the other states referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these
stocks, establish total allowable catches [TAC] for stocks originating
. its
. nvers.
.
"
m
Paragraph 3 deals with high seas fishing of anadromous stocks.
In essence, high seas fishing for anadromous species is prohibited by
paragraph 3(a) except where such a prohibition would "result in
economic dislocation." 71 Furthermore, where a state brings itself
within the exception of paragraph 3(a), high seas fishing can only be
undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the state of origin.72 The
state of origin does, however, have an obligation under paragraph
3(b) to minimize economic dislocation in such circumstances.73
Paragraph 4 specifically contemplates the situation of adjacent
coastal states by requiring cooperation in relation to management
and conservation. It provides:
In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or
through the waters landward of the outer limits of the
exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State
of origin, such state shall co-operate with the State of
origin and the other States concerned. 74

67 See Burke, supra note 62.
68

Law ofthe Sea Convention, art. 66(1).

69 The Convention through art. 56 provides signatory states with the ability to
declare jurisdiction over resources within a 200 n.m."exclusive economic zone."
70 The LOS Convention, supra note 67 at art. 66(2), by reference to para. 3(b),
extends scate of origin jurisdiction to the high seas. See Burke, supra note 62 at 103.
7l Art. 66(3)(a). See also McDorman, supra note 2 at 482.
72 Art. 66(3)(a),(c)-(d). See Burke, supra note 61 at 105.
73 Art. 66(3)(b).
74 Art. 66(4).
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The emphasis on cooperation continues in paragraph 5 where
"regional organizations" are required in order to implement the
provisions of article 66.
In summary, article 66 establishes the state of origin principle,
the principle of conservation and the duty to cooperate in relation
to international anadromous species management as general
principles of international salmon fisheries.7 5 In addition, the limits
placed by article 66 on the state of origin's control over
anadromous stocks is significant for bilateral salmon management.
Article 66(2), while providing the state of origin with the power to
regulate any high seas salmon fishing allowed under paragraph 3,
does not extend this power to salmon produced in their waters and
found within another coastal state's jurisdiction. With respect to
such stocks, the state of origin is only entitled to determine TAC
after consultation with the coastal state (approval of the coastal state
does not appear to be compulsory).
Therefore, in a sense, management of transboundary
anadromous stocks is made complicated by the scheme of article
66: while the state of origin is arguably in the best position to know
what is required for the conservation of the stocks and is competent
to regulate salmon fishing on the high seas, it cannot prescribe
regulations concerning its stocks within another coastal state's
jurisdiction. Rather, in such circumstances, the state of origin is
required to assert the requirement for cooperation in order to
attempt to give effect to its management needs. Article 66
therefore seems to support the proposition that while a state from
which anadromous stocks originate has the primary interest and
responsibility for those stocks, the state's ability to manage them
yields to an adjacent state's 200 nautical mile jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, the general international law of anadromous species
management prescribes cooperation.

3. The Pacific Salmon Treaty
i. Governing Framework and Principles
The 1985 Treaty establishes two basic principles under which
salmon fisheries by both parties are to be conducted pursuant to the
agreement. First, the parties are to "prevent overfishing and provide

75

See McDorman, supra note 2 at 483.
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for optimum production"76 and, second, they are to "provide for
each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of
salmon originating in its waters. "77 The second principle, known as
the "equity" principle, derived from the above mentioned concern
over ensuring fair salmon returns in accordance with national
production and conservation efforts.78
The equity principle reflects the state of origin principle in
article 66(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention by providing that
each country should benefit from the salmon originating in its own
waters. At the same time, in providing each party with "benefits"
rather than specifically with "salmon," it subtly modifies the
principle by acknowledging that salmon interceptions between the
two countries are unavoidable.
The word "benefits" encompasses not only economic benefits
arising from post-Treaty conservation and enhancement measures
but also economic benefits in relation to the number of thenprevailing interceptions.79 The difficulties involved in determining
levels of interceptions led the parties to append a Memorandum of
Understanding to the Treaty which allows for the implementation
of the equity principle to be phased. The Memorandum provides:
[I]t is recognized that data on the extent of interceptions
in some areas are imprecise and that it is therefore not
possible to determine with certainty the total production
of salmon from each country's rivers. It is also recognized
that methods of evaluating benefits accruing within each
country may differ. For these reasons, it is anticipated
that it will be some time before the Commission can
develop programs to implement the [equity principle] .80

Therefore, the equity principle, although an underlying tenet of
the Treaty, was rendered temporarily impotent, ostensibly by
informational and technical realities.
In exercising their rights and discharging their obligations
under the Treaty according to the conservation and equity
76 Pacific Salmon Treaty, art. III(l)(a). This has come to be seen as a focus on
conservation. See also Pacific Salmon Comission, supra note 10.
77 Pacific Salmon Treaty art. III(l)(b).
78 See Jensen, supra note 9 at 382.
79 See McRae & Munro, supra note 9 at 28.
80 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1 at Memorandum of Understanding.
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principles, article III requires the parties to consider: (1) the
desirability of reducing interceptions, (2) the avoidance of "undue
disruption" to existing fisheries, and (3) annual variations in stock
abundance. 81 The recognition granted to existing fisheries reflects
the principle in article 66(3) (a) of the LOS Convention that states
should not be economically dislocated by state of origin regulation
of anadromous species82 • The inclusion of the concept of "existing"
fisheries appears to contemplate the long standing American
reliance on Fraser River stocks which is in part both the product and
consequence of the 1930 Fraser River Convention. 83 However, as is
seen below, the inclusion of this principle has been a source of some
difficulty.
Articles IV, and X attempt to give practical expression to the
overarching principles of cooperation and coordination and, as such,
are among the ways in which the substance of the Treaty mirrors
Articles 66(4) and 63(1) of the LOS Convention. Under Article IV,
each party is required to report annually on its fishing activities to
the other party. 84 The parties are to share data on stock
interrelationships, required escapement levels, estimated total
allowable catch, run size estimates, and each country's management
objectives. 85
Bilateral research coordination is provided for by Article X
which requires joint research into the "migratory and exploitation
patterns [and] the productivity and status of stocks of common
concern." 86 Furthermore, paragraph 3 allows research to be done by
the "nationals, equipment, and vessels" of one country in the waters
of the other country with the approval of the bilateral commission
established under the Treaty. 87
Article V permits the parties to undertake salmon enhancement
programs, 88 yet does not require their creation. 89 Where they are
81

82

Ibid at art. III(3).

It is not, however, a direct parallel since art. 66(3)(a) deals with high seas
salmon fishing.
83 See McRae and Munro, supra note 8 at 30.
84 Pacific Salmon Treaty supra note 1 at art. IV(l).
85 Ibid. at art. IV(3).
86 Art. X(l).
87 This is discussed below.
88 Pacific Salmon Treaty, art. I(l) defines "enhancement" as "man-made [sic]
improvements to natural habitats or application of artificial fish culture technology
that will lead to the increase of salmon stocks."
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established, however, the parties must ensure that they are
conducted in accordance with the principles and associated
qualifications contained in Article III. 90 As well, cooperation and
coordination are again emphasized as the parties are required to
share information concerning the operation and planning of such
programs.9 1 It is somewhat curious that while the parties have
specifically encouraged salmon enhancement, there is no particular
obligation to ensure the preservation of salmon habitats. This issue
is explored below.
ii. The Pacific Salmon Commission: a Bilateral Management Regime
Article II establishes the Pacific Salmon Commission (Psc) for the
purpose of implementing the Treaty and providing regulatory
advice and recommendations to the two countries.92 The dual
principles of conservation and equity are to guide the Commission
in carrying out its functions.93 Furthermore, the PSC appears to
represent a "regional organization" akin to those contemplated by
Article 66(5) of the LOS Convention.
a. Constitution and Operating Structure of the Pacific Salmon
Commission
Article II, paragraph 1 establishes a United States section and a
Canada Section as the constituent bodies of the Commission.
Pursuant to paragraph 3, the Commission consists of eight
Commissioners, of whom four are appointed by each party to sit in
their respective sections. Paragraph 6 assigns one vote to each
section and requires the approval of both sections before a decision
or recommendation of the Commission is made.
The constitution of the United States Section is provided for in
the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985.94 Subsection 3(a) of the Act
directs that one of the four commissioners is to be from the United
States Government, one from the state of Alaska, one from the
89

Ibid. at art. V(l).
Ibid.
91 Ibid at art. V(2).
92 Ibid at art. II(S). See also the Pacific Salmon Commission supra note 10 at 12.
93 Ibid. Pacific Salmon Commission, ibid. at 12.
94 The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-5, 99 Stat. 7, 16 U.S.C ..A.
paras. 3631-44.
90
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Treaty Indian tribes of the States of Idaho, Oregon or Washington,
and one from the State of Oregon or Washington. Significantly,
section 3 designates the federal government commissioner as nonvoting and stipulates that decisions of the United States Section
cannot be taken with a dissenting vote.95
The Canadian Section of the PSC consists of one government
official, one recreational fishing representative, one fishing union
member, and one representative of the First Nations fishery.%
While there is no legal requirement for the representation of these
interests within the Canadian Section, the official position of the
Canadian government is to take into account the concerns of native,
commercial and recreational fishers as well as those of the province
of British Columbia.97 Nevertheless, the Canadian Section is "led"
by the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 98
Article II, paragraph 18 provides for the establishment of three
regional panels in accordance with annex I which sets out the
geographic scope of the panels' responsibilities. 99 Pursuant to
paragraph 19, the panels serve primarily as specialized advisory units
to the Commission and provide recommendations to the PSC with
respect to "the functions of the Commission and carry out such
other functions as the Treaty may specify or the Commission may
direct." 100 Each panel consists of six members each from the United
States and Canada. 101 Only the Fraser River Panel has the power to
directly effect in-season regulations.

95

The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, ibid. at sec. 3(g)(l).
See Twitchell, supra note 24 at 413.
97 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans News Release NR-PR-93-25E
"Crosbie Proposes Government-to-Government Discussions on Pacific Salmon
Treaty" (19 May 1993).
98 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans,"The Pacific Salmon Treaty"
Internet address: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ english/ foreign/ environ/ salmon.htm
(visited October 1996).
99 The Southern Panel supervises salmon originating in rivers that enter the
ocean south of Cape Caution, British Columbia, excluding the Fraser River. The
Fraser River Panel is charged with overseeing harvests of sockeye and pink salmon
in the geographic region outlined in Annex II. The Northern Panel is granted
responsibility for salmon originating in rivers opening into the ocean between
Cape Caution, British Columbia, and Cape Suckling, Alaska.
100 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1 at art. II(19).
IOI Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, supra note 92 at s.3(c)-(e) requires specific
regional representation on the United States' Panels.
%
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b. Powers and Duties of the Pacific Salmon Commission

In addition to setting out basic administrative duties, article II
assigns several functional duties to the Commission. Paragraph 8
provides that "the Commission may make recommendations to or
advise the parties in any matters relating to the Treaty."
Furthermore, paragraph 18 empowers the Commission to
"recommend to the parties the elimination or establishment of
Panels as appropriate."
The Commission's principal responsibilities and, therefore, the
practical operation of the Treaty, are set out in article IV. The
Commission is to receive the technical information and fisheries
reports 102 shared by the parties and is to forward this information to
the panels. 103 The panels are obligated to examine the information
and report to the Commission on their recommendations for
fishery regimes for the following year. 104 The Commission then has
the responsibility to "review the reports of the Panels and
... recommend fishery regimes to the parties." 105 Of course,
recommendation is subject to the voting requirements discussed
above. Finally, once the fishery management regimes have been
endorsed by the Commission, they only become part of the Treaty
"[o]n adoption by both parties." 106
In practical terms, the fisheries management regimes established
by the Commission constitute the essence of the Treaty. 107 The
fishery regimes are to provide for agreed catch limits, escapement
goals, fishing methods and other specifics pertaining to salmon
management. Each regime establishes a Joint Technical Committee
which assembles information 108 and reports to the appropriate
regional panel or to the Commission. Moreover, the regimes differ
in complexity, depending on the quantity and nature of data

102

Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1 at art.IV(l).
IV( 3).
IV( 4).
105 Article IV( 5).
106 Article IV( 6).
107 These are set out in the Pacific Salmon Treaty at Annex IV, ch. 1-6. Each
chapter deals with a different regional intercepting fishery.
108 The specific tasks of the Technical Committees vary between regimes. See
Pacific Salmon Treaty, annex IV, chap. 1-6.
l03 Article
104 Article
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available. 109 Finally, the regimes may be renegotiated when their
terms expire: every two years for chinook, coho, transboundary,
and boundary area regimes; every year for chum; and every four
years for the Fraser River. 110 In practice, the parties have attempted
to renegotiate regimes according to the schedule. In a sense, the
Treaty's governing principles find quantitative expression through
the Pacific Salmon Commission and the salmon management
regimes.
In summary, the Pacific Salmon Treaty provides for cooperative
transboundary salmon regulation which is broader in scope and
more ambitious in its objectives than the previous bilateral
management efforts by Canada and the United States. All species
of salmon and all salmon spawning and migratory areas within the
200 nautical mile jurisdiction of the parties are covered. Moreover,
the conservation objective of the Treaty potentially has significant
implications for the management of domestic rivers and water
routes. The Treaty calls for collaboration in many aspects of west
coast salmon management, including international research, data
collection, and enhancement. Most importantly, it creates the
Pacific Salmon Commission and charges it with the determination
of quantitative fisheries management regimes on the basis of the
Treaty principles.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty appears to be consistent with the
framework for international anadromous species regulation
contained in article 66 of the LOS Convention. The Treaty
exemplifies the principle of cooperation as well as being grounded
on the state of origin and conservation principles. Furthermore, in
acknowledging each party's inability to regulate salmon within the
other's jurisdiction, the Treaty would seem to mirror the limits set
by article 66 on the state of origin's authority to regulate its salmon
stocks.

l09 The Fraser River regime, for example, is able to provide for precise catch
allocations largely as a result of the data accumulated by the IPSFC. See Twitchell,
supra note 24 at 414.
110 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1 at Annex IV, chap. 1-6. See also
Twitchell, ibid. at 113.
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III. ANALYSIS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
PACIFIC SALMON TREATY

It has been seen that salmon management on the North American
Pacific coast requires widespread cooperation and coordination as a
matter of practical circumstance. Furthermore, the terms of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty appears to indicate an unprecedented
willingness on the parts of the United States and Canada to
cooperate through the creation of a complex and specialized
mechanism for effecting coordinated stock management. The PSC
appears to be designed so as to enable detailed salmon management
decisions based on complete scientific information and principles of
conservation and fairness. Nonetheless, reaching agreement on
mutually satisfactory management regimes has been difficult and,
frequently, altogether elusive. This section identifies numerous
aspects of the Treaty which contribute to the persistent difficulties
in realizing productive negotiations and establishing effective
salmon management regimes. The analysis reveals a tension
between the ideals of the Treaty and the ability of the structure of
the Treaty to provide for their implementation.
1. The Non-Implementation of Article III(l)(b): the Equity
Principle

One of the primary challenges to effective negotiations is the
apparent unwillingness of the United States to implement the
equity principle. In a position paper following the failed 1992
salmon negotiations, 111 Canada stated:
[I]t should be absolutely clear that Canada's position in
the forthcoming negotiations will strongly oppose
increases in interceptions and will not accept proposals
that do not move towards providing each Party with

111 These negotiations failed as a result of the inability of the parties to agree on a
joint management plan for the Fraser River Salmon. The United States insisted on
exceeding Treaty limits in respect of the Fraser River, while Canadian fishers
harvested less chinook then they were entitled to. See McDorman, supra note 2 at

492.
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"benefits equivalent
production." 112

to

[each

country's

salmon]

As a result, Canada's agreement on 1993 management regimes
came only with assurances by the United States that negotiation on
the meaning and implementation of the equity concept would take
place independently during the 1994 negotiations. 113 Nevertheless,
a lack of progress on these negotiations caused the Canadian
Section to abandon the bargaining table in 1994. 114 The United
States maintains that equity should only be given full effect when
the parties are able to arrive at a fair means of quantifying
interceptions as contemplated by the Treaty's Memorandum of
U nderstanding.115 To date, the Canadian frustration with nonimplementation of the equity principle continues, in part, to thwart
negotiations. 116
Struggles over equity can be traced to the manner in which the
principle is provided for in the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Through the
Memorandum of Understanding, the parties agreed to postpone
the implementation of the equity principle because of the difficulty
involved in assessing then prevailing levels of interceptions.
Nonetheless, the equity principle presupposes the ultimate existence
of a reliable and accurate method of quantifying interceptions in
order to provide for fair compensatory benefits. Its nonimplementation acknowledges the requirement of this capacity.
Hence, without providing for a conceivable and realistic scheme
through which the parties could arrive at mutually acceptable data
on interceptions, the equity principle was flawed from the outset.

112

Pacific Salmon Commission, 1992193 Eighth Annual Report, "Statement
Regarding the Canadian Position" at 6.
ll3 See McDorman, supra note 2 at 494.
ll4 See Brian Tobin, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Notes for an Address
(Second Annual Coastal Communities Conference on Fisheries, Prince Rupert,
B.C., 29 April, 1994).
11 5 Supra, note 112 at 16.
116 See Arnot, supra note 5.
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i. The Equity Principle and the Production of Mutually Acceptable
Information
There is evidence to show that the parties often either fail to concur
on the accuracy of data 117 or fail to concur on the appropriate
scientific model for forecasting catches or stock returns. us From
this, it is possible to identify two aspects of the Treaty which hinder
the generation of mutually acceptable information upon which the
implementation of the equity principle could be based. First, the
Treaty fails to provide for agreed upon data production methods;
the parties are able to apply and rely on any scientific model that
they choose. Second, while the Treaty does contain a mechanism
for resolving technical disputes, 11 9 this is not resorted to as a rule
and, in any event, does not appear to be capable of resolving
problems of competing methodology120 In no circumstance can the
PSC determine methodology which can then be imposed upon the
parties so as to avoid future disagreement over stock conditions and
quantities of interceptions. Moreover, as was seen, much of the
information considered by the PSC when determining "equitable"
management regimes derives from the parties themselves under
article IV, paragraph 3. Thus, until the Treaty can ensure that the
data confronting the parties reflects, as closely as possible, the true
condition of the fisheries and that it has been arrived at in a
117 In addressing a disagreement over chinook stock abundance, Canada's
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans recently remarked: "It is difficult to imagine how
Alaska could come to one conclusion ... while Canada, a little farther south, could
have a completely different experience with the same stocks of fish": Canada,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans News Release NR-HQ-95-91E "Canada
Surprised and Disappointed by Alaskan Chinook Harvest" (28 July 1995).
118 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-HQ9576E "Tobin Responds to Alaska Governor on Pacific Salmon Issues" (14 July
1995).
ll9 Pacific Salmon Treaty art. (1) provides: "Either Party may submit to the
Chairman of the Commission, for referal to a Technical Dispute Settlement Board,
any dispute concerning estimates of the extent of salmon interceptions and data
related to questions of overfishing." Art. VII(2) then states: "The findings of the
Board shall be final ... and shall be accepted by the Commission as the best scientific
information available." Notably, the parties are not bound by a finding of the Board
in respect of their respective management decisions.
120 While evidence on the perceived problems with the dispute settlement
mechanism is scarce, its lack of use combined with relatively frequent informational
disagreements suggests that neither party considers it to be a practical option.
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mutually acceptable manner, giving practical effect to the equity
principle will likely remain difficult.
ii. The Equity Principle and the Failure to Specifically Provide for its
Implementation
While a lack of mutually acceptable methodology for data
production inhibits giving the equity principle a measure of
practical effect, it is suggested that the problems over equity have
been exacerbated by the parties' failure to provide for a detailed
scheme to implement the principle. The Memorandum of
Understanding does not obligate the parties to negotiate over the
implementation of equity, nor does it fix a particular schedule for
the phasing in of the principle. Clearly, this is the source of much of
Canada's frustration in continually trying to establish negotiations
on equity.
It is further contended that in foreseeing the difficulties over
interception quantification, the parties could have provided for a
graduated implementation procedure ranging from informal
bilateral discussions to binding mediation. The failure to do so
appears to have assisted the United States in avoiding confronting
the equity issue.
iii. Definition Difficulties in the Equity Principle
The parties' failure to provide for a definition of the word
"benefits" contained in article III, paragraph 1(b) 121 may be a
contributory factor to the above noted problems, as this relates
directly to the practical effect of the equity concept. As was seen,
the "benefits" to which each Party is supposedly entitled under the
equity principle are understood in economic terms. Nonetheless,
this understanding does not appear to have assisted the parties in
achieving progress on giving effect to the equity principle. 122 It is
suggested that had the parties provided explicitly for cash or trade
concessions as compensation for imbalances in interceptions, some
degree of incentive for compliance with the equity principle might
have been introduced. Instead, the generally vague definition of the

See note 80 and accompanying text.
See Thomas Healy, "Where Artificial Constraints Kill: The Dispute Between
Canada and the United States Over Pacific Salmon" (1995) 12 Ariz. J. of Int'l &
Comp. L. at 319-20.
121
122
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concept lends itself to problems with interpretation and, ultimately,
to problems with implementation.

2. The Contradictory Effect of Article Ill, Paragraph 3(b):
«avoiding undue disruption of existing fisheries"
A further difficulty with the Treaty is revealed by the dispute over
the Alaskan chinook harvest.123 When the Treaty was first signed in
1985, the chinook fishery regime included a rebuilding program
which was to attain set escapement goals bt 1998. 124 Yet, in 1995 it
was clear that only 50% of the stocks were rebuilding and harvest
rates continued to exceed established levels. 125 Moreover, it was
evident that under the harvest ceilings provided for by the Treaty,
only one third of the wild stocks were expected to attain their 1998
escapement goals. 126 This caused the Pacific Salmon Commission's
Northern Panel to recommend a reduction in the annual harvest
levels. 127
Notwithstanding this recommendation, in 1995 Alaska
persisted in harvesting chinook in excess of Treaty limits. In 1996,
although Alaska claimed that its revised chinook management plan
complied with the Treaty requirements, Canada was adamant that
the Alaskan proposal was in excess of the Panel's recommendation
and that it represented a blatant disregard for conservation. 128
Alaska's position throughout has largely been based on Article
III, paragraph 3(b) of the Pacific Salmon Treaty which, as discussed
above, urges due regard for existing fisheries.
The Press Secretary for Alaska Governor Tony Knowles
justified Alaska's 1996 management plan in the following terms:
This is why Alaska got involved in the Treaty process to
begin with. The Treaty recognizes historic traditional

123 The problems over this harvest stem from the fact that 75% to 90% of the
chinook taken in Southeast Alaska's troll fishery originate in British Columbia,
Washington, or Oregon. See Huppert, supra note 12 at 3.
124 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1 at annex IV, chap. 3.
125 See Huppert, supra note 12 at 2.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-HQ--9652E "Canada Criticizes u.s. Chinook Management Plans for 1996" (27 June 1996).
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fisheries and the Treaty says traditional fisheries should
be maintained. 129

It is suggested that the manner in which the Treaty provides for
recognition of existing fisheries is inconsistent with the general
purpose of the accord and therefore amounts to a sharp
circumscription of efforts to balance interceptions through the
equity principle. The Pacific Salmon Treaty is designed to effect
coast-wide salmon management regimes to ensure the conservation
and equitable allocation of the salmon stocks. As was seen in the
discussion of the background to the Treaty, the decline in salmon
stocks and concern for interception stemmed in part from each
nation pursuing their respective fisheries in the absence of bilateral
cooperation. Thus, to provide non-prioritized, general protection
within the Pacific Salmon Treaty for the very fisheries which
contributed to the need for cooperation naturally risks frustrating
the aims of the Treaty.
By the same token, there may be cases where the recognition of
existing fisheries is mandated by, for example, compelling
economic circumstances. 130 In such instances, it would seem
appropriate that these fisheries be properly taken into account by a
clearly worded provision. The breadth of the current provision,
however, provides the parties to the Treaty with the argument that
certain fisheries ought not to be limited on the basis that they are
existing fisheries which stand to be "undu[ly]" disrupted. There is
no definition of "undue" provided in the section, nor is there any
qualification to "existing." As a result, Alaska can pursue an
interception fishery which is likely inconsistent with the
conservation and equity principles of the Pacific Salmon Treaty while
simultaneously asserting the same Treaty in defence of the policy.
In addition, where "existing fisheries" involve interceptions,
article III, paragraph 3(b) is inconsistent with paragraph (a) which
requires the parties to reduce interceptions. The Treaty does not
provide any priority scheme to reconcile these provisions. Again, if
paragraph (b) were better defined, it might be possible to see it as a
limited exception to paragraph (a). In light of the principles of the
Treaty, the requirement of reduction of interceptions can be argued
to have priority. Nevertheless, since the parties have included article
See Arnot, supra note 5.
A separate provision to preserve domestic First Nations Treaty obligations
from the operation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty is included in art. XI.
129

l30
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III as a general "guideline" section to the discharge of all Treaty
rights and duties, it is not surprising that definition problems and
inconsistencies between the provisions are capable of having
significant effect on the operation of the agreement.
3. The Structure and Operation of the Pacific Salmon
Commission
The recurring dispute over the Alaskan chinook harvest is also in
part illustrative of deficiencies in the operation and structure of the
Pacific Salmon Commission. In general, Canada has enjoyed the
support of Washington and Oregon in its efforts to persuade Alaska
to reduce its chinook fishery. 131 Washington and Oregon have both
experienced grave declines in the numbers of chinook spawning in
their rivers and are concerned about ensuring sufficient escapement
levels for chinook returning from south-east Alaska. 132 Nonetheless,
irrespective of the common interest between Washington, Oregon,
and Canada, the Commission has been prevented from making
recommendations for the management of chinook due to Alaska's
ability to unilaterally prevent the United States Section from
casting its vote in the Commission. l33
Canada has blamed these difficulties on the constitution of the
United States Section as provided for in the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Act. As Brian Tobin, then Canadian Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans, stated: "There is a fatal flaw in the negotiation process ... it
is a flaw in the u.s. system that allows a single interest to hijack the
outcome." 134 This, however, is a shortsighted view since the
responsibility, it is suggested, is also with the structure of the Psc.
In assigning only one vote per section yet in requiring four
members for each section, the Treaty's provisions for the
constitution of the Commission simultaneously encourage the
representation of diverse interests and preclude these interests from
131 Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-PR-95-29E
"Tobin Announces 1995 Pacific Salmon Fishing Plans Following Failed
Negotiations With the u.s." (4 July 1995).
132 See Huppert, supra note 12 at 3.
133 See Healy, supra note 122 at 317-19.
l34 Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-PR-95-29E
"Tobin Announces 1995 Pacific Salmon Fishing Plans Following Failed
Negotiaions With the U.S." (July 4 1995).

152

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

effective participation unless they can control "their" section's single
vote. It is suggested that in failing to contemplate the implications
of this structure, the Treaty has dramatically undermined its own
effectiveness since, where the parties choose to operate their
respective sections by consensus, a single voting Commissioner is
given the power to prevent the PSC from recommending fishery
regimes. This situation arises in the United States Section as a result
of the requirements of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act. The fact that
the Pacific Salmon Treaty is capable of being controlled by the
political agenda of a single United States commissioner is therefore
as much a result of the constitution of the Commission as it is the
result of the constitution of the United States Section.
By way of contrast with the structure of the IPSFC, it is
contended that regional representation could have been provided
for on the PSC without having created as significant a potential for
inaction due to single interest usurpation. As noted above, the Fraser
River Convention provided each party with three members on the
IPSFC, yet required only two votes from each set of three in order to
act. As a result, the IPSFC was able to provide some degree of
representation for regional interests (the parties were still at liberty
to select their respective commissioners) yet it also foreclosed the
possibility of complete inaction by way of a single dissenting view.
Nevertheless, by virtue of the two-votes-per-side requirement, the
IPSFC still ensured that national or broader interests could be taken
into account.
A second point of contrast with the IPSFC involves operating
powers and autonomy and relates generally to the incapacity of the
PSC. The IPSFC possessed a significant quantum of power
independently from its government architects. As noted above, the
success of the IPSFC was largely associated with its ability to provide
direct regulatory measures which bound fishers of both parties. The
PSC on the other hand is merely vested with the power to make
recommendations to the signatory governments.135 Not only is the
PSC not assigned authority to implement management regimes, it
does not possess even the relatively limited ability to generally
prescribe in-season regulations.
This scheme presents obvious problems for effective bilateral
salmon management. As the Alaskan chinook harvest dispute
I35 The only exception to this is in respect of Fraser River stocks and appears
underscore the parties' recognition of the source of the IPSFc's strengths.
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reveals, the Commission is not free to respond quickly and
effectively to sudden environmental or stock condition changes. It
cannot give effective priority to conservation where conservation
conflicts with politics. And, of course, in the event that the equity
principle is ultimately implemented, the Commission will likely be
frustrated from imposing measures to ensure balanced allocations
of interceptions and/or benefits where those measures conflict with
particular interests.
In a sense, it is difficult to understand why the Commission was
not provided with a greater measure of authority. Since the
constitution of the Commission is such that action is only possible
where the representatives of both parties agree, both governments
are assured that no decision will be taken and, thus, no powers
exercised without their support. In any event, under the current
scheme, even where the Commission can agree, the implementation
of its agreed upon measures depends exclusively on governmental
will.
A further difficulty related to the scheme of the PSC involves
the lack of a general dispute resolution forum. The parties have not
provided in the Treaty for a general mechanism to resolve disputes
both during negotiations and during the life of the management
regimes. The technical dispute resolution mechanism appears to be
too limited in its scope and potential to be of any practical use to
the parties. Therefore, even where the Psc's recommendations are
adopted by the respective governments, any conflict arising during
the term of an agreement is likely to remain unresolved unless the
parties muster the political will to arrive at a solution. There is no
requirement that the Commission even investigate general disputes
and provide recommendations for their resolution to the parties.

4. The Lack of Habitat Protection Obligations
The decline in chinook stocks ongmating from rivers in
Washington and Oregon has contributed to the dispute over the
chinook harvest in south-east Alaska and also highlights a further
difficulty with the scheme of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. It is noted
above that one of the historical factors which gave rise to the need
for cooperative management in respect of west coast salmon is
environmental degradation. As revealed by the Fraser Canyon
disaster in the early part of the century and dam construction
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during the 1960s and 1970s, the destruction of inland salmon
habitats can have a significant impact on ocean stocks. More
recently, both the United States and Canada have acknowledged
that "development" in Washington and Oregon has reduced and
continues to depress chinook stocks which are an important part of
both the United States' harvest and Canada's interception
fisheries. 136
Given the experience with habitat destruction in the Pacific
north-west, it is somewhat surprising that the Treaty does not
contain an express habitat provision. Importantly, the failure to
include habitat protection obligations appears to undermine the
principle of conservation contained in article III, paragraph 1 (a).
Although this provision requires the parties in principle to ensure the
"optimum production" of stocks, the parties are not made directly
responsible under the Treaty for the protection of salmon
environments within their boundaries.
This fact is significant for the overall operation of the Treaty. In
both permitting and allocating salmon interceptions, the Treaty has
effectively acknowledged the de facto sharing of the west coast
salmon resources. Both parties are dependent on fish produced in
the other parties rivers and tributaries. It follows from this that
where one party destroys or corrupts salmon habitat within its
territory, the other party's fisheries stand to be affected.
Furthermore, a simple rebalancing of interceptions is not always a
viable remedy to this dilemma since interception fisheries can be
location specific. For example, where coastal community fishers in
British Columbia are largely dependent on chinook spawned in
Oregon and Washington, a compensatory increase in Canadian
interceptions off Vancouver Island is, in practical terms, useless for
the coastal fishers who have lost harvests due to poor habitat
protection in the United States.
5. Insight from the Analysis: The Tension Between Allocation
and Conservation
While the foregoing critical analysis of the Pacific Salmon Treaty is
not exhaustive, it exposes the tension within the Treaty between
competing emphases on balanced and conservative long-term
l36 See Pacific Salmon Commission Eighth Annual Report 1992193, supra note
112 at 9.
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management and a general reluctance to "jeopardize" short-term
allocation interests.
First, it is contended that since the equity principle stems from
an interest in the fair distribution of the salmon resource, it reflects
a general determination to avoid international competition and
consequential overfishing. It therefore represents a partial effort to
provide for the long term preservation of the salmon stocks. At the
same time, however, the failure to provide for both a scheme by
which to implement the equity principle and a mutually acceptable
framework for reaching agreement on quantifying and evaluating
interceptions suggests an indisposition to effect a practical
departure from existing fishing patterns. The parties cannot expect
to achieve balanced, long term interception allocations without
some modification of previous fishing practices since, as was seen,
these practices contributed to the basic need for cooperanve
management.
The same tension between the principle of cooperative
conservation and the reluctance to risk immediate interests is
revealed explicitly in the incongruity between "avoiding undue
disruption of existing fisheries" and the principles of equity and
conservation. In requiring avoidance of disruption to existing
fisheries, the Treaty clearly indicates a concern for the maintenance
of established fisheries, at least for the short term. Nevertheless,
long term sustainable interceptions may well require that existing
fisheries be restructured or eliminated. Until there is relative
priority assigned to these concepts, arguments based on the shortterm maintenance of existing fisheries can continue to frustrate and
conflict with efforts to provide for long-term conservation and
balancing of west coast salmon harvests.
The structure and operation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
suggests an unwillingness by the parties to delegate any degree of
general control over the salmon fisheries to an international body.
As a result, the provisions of the Treaty in respect of direct fisheries
management are not given effect without the full approval of the
parties and short term political interests are able to take advantage
of the structure to significantly influence the course of salmon
management. Under this architecture, effective long term
cooperative use of the salmon resource remains elusive and the
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principle of conservation becomes increasingly subordinated to
short-term allocation interests.
The tension between conservation and allocation in this respect
results from the fact that the Pacific Salmon Treaty assumes that
cooperation is a prerequisite for effective conservation; however, the
structure and operation of the rsc practically ensure against
effective cooperation except in the event that it is mutually
convenient. Thus, it is suggested that although the rsc was
established in order to effect coordinated management designed in
part at the conservation of the resource, it is shackled by its
constitution and operating powers which reserves the parties'
independence and autonomy. Given the example of the Alaskan
chinook breakdown, it appears that the national independence and
autonomy under the Treaty often serves immediate allocation
interests.
This tension is further highlighted by the failure of the parties
to provide for habitat protection obligations within the Treaty.
Given the anadromous nature of the salmon species, long term
conservation of salmon stocks requires more than regulated ocean
harvests and the development of artificial enhancement programs.
History has shown that without the assurance of suitable inland
habitats, the west coast salmon resource is imperiled. Nevertheless,
even though conservation is one of the founding principles of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty, inland habitat protection obligations are not
included within the scheme of the accord. This is suggestive once
again of a reservation on the part of both countries to restrain their
autonomy for the purpose of effecting long-term, conservationoriented salmon management.
In short, a critical analysis of the Pacific Salmon Treaty in light
of recent breakdowns in bilateral salmon management relations
reveals inconsistencies between the Treaty's governing principles and
its practical scheme. While the spirit of the Treaty posits resource
conservation and balance through the equity principle and the
general recognition of the need for cooperation, aspects of the
structure of the accord tend to frustrate these objectives. This stems
primarily from the operation and structure of the rsc, however, it is
also underscored by a concern to prevent the disruption of both
existing fisheries wherever possible and by a general reluctance to
"undermine" the ability of protecting short(er)-term interests in
resource allocation.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Pacific Salmon Treaty represents an ambitious attempt by
Canada and the United States to cooperate over the management
of west coast salmon. As noted, the need for cooperation stems
from the anadromous nature of salmon and the general importance
of the resource, as well as the international implications of regional
management strategies and local environmental degradation. As
was also noted that the international law on anadromous species
management, while requiring cooperation in vague terms,
contributes to the complexity of managing salmon stocks by
simultaneously recognizing the state of origin principle and
preserving the 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of the coastal state.
The Treaty demonstrates the scope and complexity of the
cooperative effort undertaken by Canada and the United States;
however, a critical analysis of the Treaty in light of recent examples
of bilateral breakdowns in salmon negotiations casts the tensions
within the scheme of the Treaty into sharp relief.
While it is idealistic to maintain that effective cooperation can
be absolutely guaranteed through an international legal accord,
aspects of the Pacific Salmon Treaty dearly prevent optimum
bilateral coordination. In order to move toward more effective joint
management on the west coast, specific resolutions to these
problems need to be ascertained. The following brief
recommendations address some of the problems identified:

1. The parties must implement the equity principle. Until
there is general agreement that salmon management and
allocation is fair under the Treaty, the ongoing establishment of
acceptable fishery regimes will remain challenging. T award this
end, the parties should negotiate equity independently with a
view to establishing a practical, scientifically feasible, and
agreeable implementation scheme.
2. The structure of the Pacific Salmon Commission should
be reformed. The consensus requirement should be questioned
and the possibility of providing each Commissioner with one
vote should be explored.
3. As long as the constitution of the Pacific Salmon
Commission remains unchanged, the United States Section
should provide the United States government representative
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with the power to determine a decision where the other
Commissioners are unable to arrive at a consensus.
4. The parties need to reevaluate the manner in which the
Treaty gives practical expression to the principle of conservation.
This may include providing the PSC with the responsibility for
overseeing designated salmon habitat areas or including an
annex to the Treaty which outlines obligations to ensure against
habitat degradation.
5. If the parties determine that a bilateral body is most
appropriate for effective salmon management, the body must
be provided with some independent ability to implement
management measures.
6. Finally, and perhaps as a condition precedent to the
above suggestions, the parties need to determine the extent to
which they are prepared to forego more immediate local
interests in order to obtain the long term goals of balance and
conservation.

In essence, the Pacific Salmon Treaty represents an international
legal response to a problem which derives from the imposition of
"artificial" political divisions on the life cycle of a species which
adheres only to natural boundaries. Since this is a common issue
associated with the regulation and conservation of living resources,
the study of one example at overcoming the dilemma may provide
clues for future efforts. In generalized terms, the shortcomings of
the Pacific Salmon Treaty identified in this examination reveal that
the greater the distance is between the principles and the practical
substance of an international resource management effort, the less
likely it is that the cooperative effort will realize success. Although it
is abundantly clear that effective management of marine resources
cannot occur without international cooperation, nations that choose
to cooperate must realistically confront the question of what
compromises they are prepared to make. Cooperating states must
ensure that any accord established consistently expresses both in
principle and in substance the extent of their willingness to
compromise in order to achieve effective coordinated management.
Until the United States and Canada can achieve this balance,
successful negotiations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty are likely to
remain elusive.
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V. POST SCRIPT

Since the time of writing, the most recent efforts to establish fishing
regimes under the Pacific Salmon Treaty stalled and ultimately
failed during the summer of 1997. In the midst of the stalemate,
there was further protest action and political tension, including a
blockade by B.c. fishers of an Alaskan ferry. As a result, a u.s.
Senate resolution called for u.s. naval intervention to protect
Alaska's passage rights, and independently established "aggressive"
fohing policies. 137 Moreover, as the gulf between the u.s. and
Canadian sides widened, the dispute was further complicated by
division within Canada as the British Columbia government
became increasingly disillusioned with the federal government's
efforts to find an acceptable resolution.
The most recent dispute essentially stems from the Canadian
view that Alaskan fishers take a far greater number of sockeye
salmon than they are entitled to by the Treaty. 138 Indeed, it is
widely recognized by all sides to the dispute that Alaskan fishers
caught approximately four times the amount of sockeye in 1997
than the Alaskan fleet normally nets during the season. 139 The
Alaskan government maintains that the increase in the sockeye
catch is "incidental" to its catch of pink salmon and that it is
abiding by the terms of the Treaty. 140 Nevertheless, Canada's belief
in Alaskan overfishing led to an official Canadian "fish offensive"
aimed in part at generating a protest from Washington and
Oregon, which in turn was hoped would pressure Alaska into
agreement with the Canadian position. 141
As the political storm between the United States, British
Columbia, and Canada continued into the fall of 1997, hopes for
the possibility of future agreement rested largely with David
Strangway and William Ruckelshaus. The individuals appointed in
137 "Darn Yankees" Maclean 's (4 August 1997) at 12-14.
138 "Salmon war declared by B.C." The {Toronto} Globe and Mail

(18 July 1997)

A-1.
l39 "Alaskan salmon haul larger than feared" The [Toronto} Globe and Mail (26
] uly 1997) A-8.
140 "Alaska asking for millions in salmon row" The [Toronto} Globe and Mail
(29 July 1997) A-1.
l4l "Canada Plans Fish Offensive" The {Toronto} Globe and Mail (30 July 1997)
A-1.
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July by Canada and the United States respectively as "emminent
persons" assigned to identify a way to bring the Canadian and
American sides together again. 142 The pair is due to report in early
1998.
The latest conflict over Pacific salmon further underscores the
shortcomings of the Pacific Salmon Treaty and reinforces the urgent
need for reform. The equity principle is still not implemented.
Canada remains adamant about the importance of this principle
and committed to an interpretation of "equity" which would
significantly reduce Alaska's current salmon fishery. 143 Predictably,
Alaska presses a contrary interpretation of equity and continues to
rely upon the ambiguous language of the Treaty to justify its
position. 144 In any event, no effort has been taken to resolve the
technical, definitional, and implementational difficulties associated
with the principle. Thus, as the Treaty currently reads, Alaska and
Canada can continue to reasonably rely upon it to defend
contradictory positions.
Alaska's position of influence continues largely as a result of the
structure of the Pacific Salmon Commission and the operation of
the United States Section. A call for reform in these areas is thus
reiterated. Unless and until reform occurs, an agreement under the
Treaty which fails to meet Alaska's specifications remains most
unlikely.
Finally, the relationship between the current salmon dispute and
the defects in the Treaty was cast into sharp and explicit relief with
the resignation of commissioner Robert Wright from the Pacific
Salmon Commission in September, 1997. In an interview soon after
his resignation, Mr. Wright remarked:
The salmon Treaty was doomed from the day of its
being signed. I don't think we'll ever get an agreement
on fish quotas the way it is written today ... .It [is] a bare
bones document with no agreement on even simple
concepts. 145

142

"Envoys hopes may be doomed, B.C. Premier says of salmon talks" The Globe
and Mail (1 November 1997) A-4.
143 Supra note 135 at 16.
144 Ibid.
145 "Salmon Treaty Member Resigns" The [Toronto} Globe and Mail (11
September 1997) A-1.
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Mr. Wright was also particularly critical of the structure of the
u.s. Section and the vague nature of the Treaty.
Thus, although the need for international cooperation in the
management of west coast salmon fisheries has not diminished, the
latest saga in the ongoing dispute under the Pacific Salmon Treaty
suggests that the likelihood of an agreement is indeed remote. To
the extent that the 1997 dispute continues to reflect significant
deficiencies within the Treaty, effective international cooperation
will only be achieved through substantial reform of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty or, perhaps, a fresh effort in the form of a new
agreement.

